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Your truth that lacks the warmth of lies, 
the ability to compromise. 
John Hewitt 
Whenever things threatened to fall apart during our negotiations - and they did on many 
occasions - we would stand back and remind ourselves that if negotiations broke down the 
outcome would be a blood bath of unimaginable proportions, and that after the blood bath we 
would have to sit down again and negotiate with each other. The thought always sobered us up, 
and we persisted, despite many setbacks. 
President Nelson Mandala 
Arniston, South Africa 
29 May 1997 
South African President Mandela addressed his words to the leaders of political 
parties in Northern Ireland, including David Trimble and Martin McGuinness, at 
De Hoop, a secured conference facility in Arniston, a small town in the Western 
Cape. 
The conference was dubbed the De Hoop lndaba - lndaba is the Zulu word for 
a "meeting of the minds." The event, which was hosted by the South African 
government, brought together the chief negotiators from all parties .in Northern 
Ireland -the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 
the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP), Sinn Fein (SF), the Women's Coalition (WC), the Ulster 
Democratic Party (UDP), the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Labour 
Party (LP), for a three-day private meeting with the people from all parties in 
South Africa who had negotiated the historic settlement in November 1993 that 
ended white minority rule, installed a nonracial transitional government, opened 
the way to South Africa's first nonracial election in April 1994, and the 
subsequent Government of National Unity (GNU). 1 
Today, President Nelson's words still resonate. Indeed, the constant refrain of 
the parties supporting the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in the run-up to the 
referendum that endorsed the agreement was of a similar nature: If not the 
agreement, what is the alternative? A question that helped to sober up the 
electorate provided them with food for thought after thirty years of conflict and 
was certainly a factor in its decision to vote for the historic compromise. Eighteen 
months later, winding up his review of the agreement necessitated by the 
impasse over the formation of a power-sharing Executive that would include Sinn 
Fein, the political wing of the IRA, and the decommissioning of arms by the IRA, 
Senator George Mitchell addressed the assembled media and warned that "even 
the dogs in the street knew that without a power-sharing Executive in place, 
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there would be no decommissioning." When David Trimble had to ask his 858 
colleagues on the Ulster Unionist Council who constitute the ruling body of the 
UUP to endorse his willingness to give Mitchell's recommendations a chance, 
he, too, posed the question to them in the same vein. And when he had to face 
them again in February 2000, his colleagues had to address this one unchanging 
reality. 
NORTHERN IRELAND AND SOUTH AFRICA: 
COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS 
Comparisons between the conflicts in South Africa and Northern Ireland should 
not be lightly made. However, the two share similarities that shed light on the 
nature of the conflict in each. The conflicts both in Northern Ireland and in South 
Africa have much in common, but to compare or contrast them directly without 
each being put in the context of its own history would be misleading and 
specious. 
This much can be said. Both conflicts share common structural characteristics 
typical of divided societies. The dominant community (Afrikaners in South Africa, 
Protestants in Northern Ireland) came from settler populations, and the 
subordinate community (blacks in South Africa, Catholics in Northern Ireland) 
was indigenous. In both cases, the dominant community asserted an equal claim 
to the land. 
Afrikaners trace their roots to a trading post their forebears established on the 
Cape of Good Hope in 1652. Protestants trace theirs to the plantation of Ulster in 
1607. In neither case is there a "mother'' country to which the designated "settler" 
population can return, nor would the designated "mother'' countries regard 
themselves as such. 
Many divided society conflicts have roots in the indigenous/settler dichotomy, 
especially where the settlers disposed of the indigenous as the ruling elite, but 
they are in themselves insufficient explications of the root causes of why conflict 
emerges in some multiethnic societies and why it does not in others. 
There is no literature that comprehensively documents why some conflicts are 
more amenable to settlement - not resolution - than others. Each beats to the 
rhythms of its own contradictory impulses, hostage to myth and history, 
distortions of reality, imprisoned in misrepresentation, warped perceptions, and 
insatiable demands for revenge that are the legacy one generation bequeaths to 
the next. In some, the long duration of the conflicts leads to" the evolution of 
social mechanisms to regulate and control the relationships [between the parties 
in conflict], and unable either to remove each other and unwilling to assimilate, 
they gradually evolved forms of relationships which regulated rather than 
resolved their antagonisms."2 
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In Northern Ireland, such social controls evolved. Acceptable levels of political 
instability became the norm, thus reducing the pressure on the politicians and 
their party masters to engage in the intense dialogue that is inevitably necessary 
to break historical logjams. 
In South Africa, apartheid mandated the forms of relationships that existed 
between blacks and whites. When apartheid began to crumble, the absence of 
political and social space to create new forms of relationships, except among 
certain elements of the elite, widened the divide between blacks and whites, 
encouraging the liberation movements to make the townships ungovernable. 
When it became increasingly clear that the government no longer had the 
stomach to pay them the price control the townships exacted, given its own 
uncertainties - and divisions - as to the way forward. These uncertainties were 
reinforced by the government's reluctant conclusions in the mid-eighties that 
apartheid was no longer a viable proposition nor one that could be propped up 
indefinitely by made-to-order reforms. 
Yet, it remained unsure with what to replace apartheid, and unwilling- or unable 
-to contemplate the ramifications of the inevitable -a universal franchise and 
a total dismantling of the apartheid apparatus; in short, the surrender of power. 
Nevertheless, while the social controls to regulate the conflict were deteriorating 
at an exponential rate, they did not collapse, thus providing the leeway for the 
risks both the ANC and the National Party (NP) government had to confront in 
their respective communities in order to convince their constituencies that neither 
was about to sell them out in negotiations. 
Certainly, the degree to which indigenous and settler populations intermix, the 
prevalence of intermarriage, the level of social integration, the degree to which 
religious or ethnic affiliations become purveyors of the perceived threats of 
difference rather than the perceived enrichments of diversity and the salience of 
dispossession as one group's historical starting point contribute enormously to 
political and socioeconomic imbalances. These eventually express themselves in 
conflict when satisfactory forms of equilibrium among competing interests 
become impossible to calibrate. 
On the other hand, the "narcissism of small differences," which postulates that 
the more objectively alike opposing groups are, the more they magnify their 
pseudo differences is a more satisfying theoretical model to explore. In South 
Africa, marginal whites, especially Afrikaners in the lower classes who were part 
of the apartheid government's "welfare state" for its own Oob reservation for 
whites only, for instance)- were far more opposed to reforms that would give 
more opportunities to blacks than better-off whites, since they would be far more 
likely to feel the consequences. 3 In Northern Ireland, support for militant 
Loyalism flourished in the Protestant working classes, also job beneficiaries of 
Protestant hegemony, who felt more threatened by changes that would provide 
more opportunities for Catholics than their middle- and upper-class compatriots. 
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In South Africa the militant white right drew its support from the ranks of the less 
well-off Afrikaner working class; in Northern Ireland, the Protestant paramilitary 
organizations drew their members from the less well-off Protestant working 
class.4 
Thus, class differences exacerbate racial and ethnic affinities, and the 
consequences of radical change that would alter the balance of power among 
competing classes played an underreported, often subliminal role during 
negotiations in both conflicts. The elite have a high,ly developed propensity for 
protecting their own interests.5 
In other respects, demography has shaped the contours of the conflicts in 
Northern Ireland and South Africa. In South Africa, the 17 percent minority white 
population dominated the black population; in Northern Ireland, at least until the 
British government abolished the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972, the 65 
percent Protestant population dominated Catholics. In South Africa the rate of 
growth of the black population greatly exceeds that of the white population, while 
in Northern Ireland the Catholic proportion of the population has been steadily 
increasing. 
As a result, in South Africa, whites were being forced to face a situation in which 
their numbers alone would be insufficient to either ensure their capacity to 
maintain control of state institutions or to contain black insurrection. In Northern 
Ireland, the size of the Catholic minority continued to ensure that Protestant rule 
would be immobilized if Catholics were to withdraw their consent to the modes of 
governance. In both cases, the dominant group saw itself as being superior to 
the other- even marginal members of superior groups derive status from 
belonging to their particular group. 
When that marginal status is threatened, they react, often violently, to protect 
their positions. Hence, in Northern Ireland, the fears of right-wing working-class 
Protestants who support Loyalist paramilitaries and, in South Africa the fears of 
marginal whites who flocked to the Conservative Party and militant right -wing 
organizations like the AWB. One of the less heeded lessons of history is that the 
"outs" in the "in" groups always want to preserve the status quo. 
But as important, as a result of the manner in which both governments tried to 
"manage" their conflicts, a number of perceptions common to both developed. 
Both governments tried to promote allegiance to the state on the basis of law 
rather than on the consent of the governed. Both governments pursued policies 
that supplemented military measures to combat political terrorism by increasing 
use of the judicial process, and both ended up subverting the judicial process. 
And because both governments went out of their way to present the problem of 
violence as one of law and order, of internal security or national security, 
Catholics and blacks alike lost faith in the police, the whole paraphernalia of the 
legal and judicial systems, and therefore in the states themselves. The 
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perception of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland and the black 
community in South Africa was that the law was an instrument of the state's 
security and political policies rather than of justice. 
Hence two antithetical perceptions of justice prevailed in each place. Northern 
Ireland Catholics and South African blacks regarded the administration of justice 
as being unfair; they saw themselves as being "policed" by the dominant 
Protestant and white communities, respectively; in each the police were the 
"enemy." Both argued that their state's emergency powers were aimed almost 
exclusively against them; they saw that those who were charged with upholding 
the law broke it routinely and were not held accountable for their actions. 
South African whites and Ulster Protestants saw the reverse: The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (respectively, the military wings 
of Sinn Fein and the ANC) were engaging in terrorist campaigns with the 
objective of overthrowing the state; both South African whites and Ulster 
Protestants feared being "swamped" or "absorbed" -whites in a South Africa 
ruled by an overwhelming black majority; Protestants in a united Ireland ruled by 
an overwhelming Catholic majority. Both regarded the security forces as too 
lenient with paramilitary groups; both argued that emergency laws were not 
sufficiently stringent and not enforced with sufficient vigor. Both saw Catholic and 
black unwillingness to support the police as indicative of support for the 
advocates of violence. 
There are, of course, other significant differences, too, between both conflicts. 
One involves the question of sovereignty. Northern Ireland is part of the United 
Kingdom. However, Irish governments and the Irish constitution always asserted 
that Northern Ireland was a part of Ireland's national territory. No Irish 
government paid more than lip service to the claim, and no British government 
paid any attention to it. But in Northern Ireland, where ethnic affiliation was the 
defining characteristic of the conflict, the Irish constitutional claim was a fault-
line.6 Competing claims to different national identities are at the core of the 
conflict. 
In South Africa, sovereignty, too, played a role in the conflict, but with a 
significant difference. At one level, the conflict centered on the majority of the 
citizens of South Africa demanding the right to exercise their prerogatives as 
citizens of South Africa, especially the right to vote. Until the mid-1980s, only 
whites were statutorily citizens; blacks were citizens of the ethnic homelands the 
white regime carved out for them. When that policy was revoked in 1986, it was 
not accompanied by the dismantling of apartheid and the all-encompassing 
range of laws that were flagrant violations of the human rights of the black 
community. 
Hence, the crisis of legitimacy in South Africa that separated the protagonists. All 
South Africans -blacks (African, Coloured, and Indian) and whites share a 
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common identity- they regard themselves as South Africans. However, for 
whites the basis for identity was exclusiveness - a whites-only attribute. 
Blacks were denied the franchise in South Africa because whites had designated 
them as citizens of their respective homelands, not as citizens of South Africa. 
Thus, what black liberation movements in South Africa sought was universal 
suffrage- one person, one vote- the recognition of their identity as South 
Africans, not as citizens of white-created ethnic homelands. For blacks the basis 
for identity was inclusiveness. However, universal suffrage would ensure that the 
black majority would rule the country, erasing the privileges and power of the 
ruling white minority. In short, blacks aspired to the rule of the majority and the 
white minority was prepared to go to any lengths to prevent a black takeover. 
Once whites acknowledged that all South Africans, regardless of color, were 
citizens of South Africa, they were faced with the dilemma of how to reconcile 
that belief with its corollary - the concomitant rights of blacks to full political 
rights - and simultaneously trying to prevent the death knell of white 
dominance. 
But what defined the crucial differences between the two conflicts were the 
measures that the dominant communities adopted to preserve their power and 
privilege. In South Africa, the Afrikaner state implemented racial policies of 
apartheid and separation with methodical and brutal force. They made blacks 
nonpersons in their own country, forcing the resettlement of millions, destroying 
family life and undermining its social fabric, requiring them to live in 
underserviced and overpopulated townships or in white demarcated 
"Bantustans." Blacks were totally disenfranchised and denied any expression of 
their aspirations. Indeed, Afrikaners went one step further. They defined black 
aspirations, provided the "homelands" in which blacks could achieve them, and 
forcibly moved millions into these homelands so that they might enjoy the 
benefits of their "heritage"-as defined by whites. 
But neither the level of subordination Catholics had to endure nor the harshness 
of the dominant regime ever reached the level of repression that the Afrikaner 
regime imposed in South Africa. To say, therefore, that the situations of South 
African blacks and Northern Ireland Catholics were similar is to trivialize the 
enormous suffering South African blacks endured. Apartheid was evil, 
condemned by the United Nations as "a crime against humanity." The kinds of 
majority domination practiced and enforced by Protestants in Northern Ireland 
were repulsive and wrong but hardly evil. Moreover, most of the measures of 
Protestant ascendancy were alleviated after the British government abolished 
the Ulster parliament and introduced Direct Rule in 1972. 
While there are common elements to the inequities both societies face as a 
result of the legacies of past discrimination, injustices, and being deliberately 
disadvantaged - either through legislative measures or willful action on the part 
of the dominant group - the social and economic imbalances between Catholics 
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and Protestants in Northern Ireland are relatively insignificant compared with the 
imbalances between blacks and whites in South Africa. Moreover, the emphasis 
put on redressing these injustices will be strikingly different. Socioeconomic 
imbalances in Northern Ireland will be addressed in the context of similar 
imbalances existing in other parts of the UK. In South Africa, the ANC, with its 
huge base of popular support, is attempting to restructure the "molecular'' 
composition of society itself, to bring about a total transformation that will reach 
into every echelon of society through legislative means and within the broad 
boundaries of its new constitution. 
In Northern Ireland, on the other hand, although many of the institutions that are 
shaping the South African transformation are provided for in the GFA- a Bill of 
Rights, Equality, Gender, and Human Rights commissions, and so on -their 
remits do not envisage societal restructuring and they do not have the breadth of 
powers of parallel institutions in South Africa. 
Thus, while the purpose of negotiations in both societies was to produce a 
settlement which would ensure that all people were treated with "parity of 
esteem," the measures necessary to ensure parity will require a fundamental 
restructuring of South Africa on a scale that is not envisioned in the Northern 
Ireland settlement. 
Another fundamental difference: the moral difference. The ANC represented the 
great majority of blacks and was engaged in a genuine war of national liberation 
that would give its people the voting franchise they were denied and the right to 
elect a government of their own choosing. The ANC resorted to an armed 
struggle only as a measure of last resort when the government refused to 
engage in discussions on measures to resolve any issue.7 The ANC fought a just 
war, although the means it used to pursue a just aim were not always 
themselves just.8 
The IRA, on the other hand, was not fighting a war of national liberation, did not 
enjoy widespread support in Northern Ireland and next to none in the South. At 
best, the IRA represented a minority (of nationalists) of a minority (republicans) 
of a minority (physical force hard-liners) in Northern Ireland, and was even more 
unrepresentative of the South's political proclivities.9 
So while the ANCs met the criteria for a just war, the IRAs did not, and the IRA 
used innumerable occasions to employ unjust means in the pursuit of its unjust 
war. Any attempt on the part of militant republicans to equate the IRA actions 
with the actions of Umkhonto we Sizwe (M K) is both politically and morally 
indefensible. The former lacked political legitimacy and moral standing; the latter 
had both. Indeed, Nationalists' demands that erupted into mass confrontations 
between Catholics and Protestants in the late 1960s had been met by the British 
government. 10 In this sense there was never any moral equivalence between the 
two conflicts. 
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Questions of identity are invariably pulled out of the conflict-resolution hat to 
explain conflict in deeply divided societies. They are important to take into 
account, but at the root of conflict is fear: the fear the dominant class has of the 
consequences of change, whether it involves a loss of power, status, absorption 
by another culture, ethos, tradition, or whatever the values and norms and 
particular characteristics the dominant tradition associate as being essential to its 
own survival. 
In Northern Ireland, which has been part of the UK since the partition of Ireland 
in 1921, the conflict is between two competing identities and national aspirations. 
Of the population of approximately 1.5 million, 40 percent are Catholics, most of 
whom regard themselves as Irish and aspire to become part of the rest of 
Ireland, which is 95 percent Catholic. 
The majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland have consistently made it clear that 
they wanted to pursue the aspiration to Irish unity in a peaceful manner while 
being able to express their lrishness and participate on the basis of equality in 
the government in Northern Ireland. Hence their calls for power sharing in 
Northern Ireland and some institutional expression of their relationship with the 
rest of Ireland- the Irish Dimension. 
The 60 percent of the population who are Protestants regard themselves as 
British and want to remain part of the UK. Their most profound fear is that the 
two governments -the British and the Irish -will somehow collude to "deliver'' 
them into a united Ireland where they would be culturally and religiously 
absorbed and constitute a minority of 20 percent. The religious component of 
their fears cannot be overstressed. 11 
Most white South Africans had been "brainwashed" into believing that the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), was the vanguard of Soviet expansionism into 
Southern Africa, the "crown jewel" of its rapacious intentions. The threat of the 
Total Onslaught from atheistic Communism became ingrained in the white 
psyche. 12 The SACP, the subversive agent of the Soviets, was using the ANC as 
a front to overthrow the South African government and impose a communist 
regime. 
The analogy with Protestant fears in Northern Ireland that they will somehow be 
coerced into a united Ireland is striking, all the more so because it, too, is 
irrational, the product of perceived rather than actual threat. They fear being 
subjected to the rule of a Catholic state that takes its marching orders from 
Rome. A significant number of Democratic Unionist Party supporters are 
members of lan Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church or other right-wing 
Protestant sects. They fear negotiations, viewing them as instruments that are 
carefully calibrated to ensure that one day they will wake up to find themselves 
part and parcel of an all-Ireland state. They fear that if such a situation were to 
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arise, they would be absorbed into and dominated by the larger Catholic culture, 
and that religious and cultural absorption would inevitability lead to extinction. 
Ethnic cleansing of a different kind. 13 
In South Africa since the mid-eighties, the government had slowly come to the 
conclusion that its security apparatus, despite the magnitude of the resources at 
its disposal, could not "defeat" the liberation movement. The ANC had slowly 
come to the conclusion that the armed struggle and the internal campaign to 
make the country "ungovernable" could not "defeat" the government. Their 
trajectories were about to intersect. 14 
Again, in Northern Ireland, the situation was more complicated. 
Only when Sinn Fein and the IRA were brought to the point where they 
understood that even though the British could not defeat the IRA they could 
contain it; that the IRA could not militarily defeat the British; that the British were 
not about to "withdraw" from Northern Ireland; that Northern Ireland would 
remain part of the UK as long as that was the wish of a majority of the people 
there; that an all-Ireland state was not in the offing unless the Catholic 
community could convince the Protestant community that its future lay in its 
being part of some all-Ireland arrangement rather than a peripheral part of 
Britain; that that might never happen and would never happen if the IRA 
continued to resort to violence; that the Protestants of Northern Ireland had the 
right to say no to a united Ireland; that the IRA's targeting of members of the 
RUG and the UDR as part of the British "killing" machine had embittered the 
Protestant community to the point where reconciliation would take a long time to 
achieve, that a united Ireland was not on the cards now, in the foreseeable 
future, or perhaps ever, could the first traces of a peace process emerge.15 
The "enemy" with which they would have to negotiate was not the British 
government but the representatives of the Protestant community in Northern 
Ireland --the UUP, DUP, PUP, and UDP. If they were ever to cut a deal, these 
were the stakeholders with whom they would have to cut the deal. 
For its part, the Protestant community had to rethink some of its own most 
sacred shibboleths: that rule by the majority in a deeply divided society was not 
democratic since the dominant community would always be in a position to 
impose its will on the minority community; that it would have to accept 
entrenched power sharing between the two communities, providing for parity of 
esteem between their respective traditions, cultures, political aspirations, and 
senses of national identity; that its right to say no to a united Ireland was 
counterbalanced by the right of Catholics to aspire to one; that special 
relationships existed between the two parts of Ireland that had to be 
accommodated in an institutional framework; that the right of Catholics to 
express their lrishness had to be on an equal footing with the right of Protestants 
to express their Britishness. 
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Only when both sides had come to similar conclusions regarding the nature of 
the matters that had to be negotiated did a basis for negotiations exist. Both 
sides had legitimate rights and interests to protect; both had grievances that had 
to be addressed; neither "owned" victimhood, and neither could expect to 
achieve through a process of negotiations all that they had hoped for or aspired 
to. 
Only when both could put the basis for a settlement in the perspective of what 
they had managed to achieve on their own behalf and what they had managed 
to preclude the other from achieving could there be actual, if gradual, "drift" 
towards agreement. 
THE ARNISTON INDABA 
The purpose of the Arniston conference was not to proscribe but for the South 
Africans to describe, share, bear witness, as it were, to their own experience that 
even in the most intractable of conflicts there are common denominators to the 
processes that must be created, the structures that must be put in place, the 
procedural principles that must be followed, the compromises that must be 
assented to, the trade-offs that must be condoned, and above all the trust that 
must be cultivated and blossom before negotiations can come to fruition, and a 
settlement, no doubt as flawed as the flawed individuals who put its fragile parts 
together, is agreed. 
The most salient of these common denominators the South Africans identified for 
the Northern Irish were: 
• There should be transparency and openness in the negotiating process. To 
whatever extent is possible, all stakeholders- business, unions, other 
institutional organs of civil society, and the constituencies of the protagonists 
should be made part of the process. On no account should an impression be 
given that deals are being done behind closed doors. 
• On the other hand, some deals must be done in confidence - not in secret. 
Confidentiality means that parties in bilateral or multilateral talks reach 
agreements that are not revealed at the time they are arrived at. But these 
agreements are ultimately part of the settlement "package" that is represented 
to the parties' constituents for their endorsement. Secret deals, on the other 
hand, are not put in the public domain, are only revealed in time, if at all, after 
a settlement is agreed but for which the public's endorsement is never sought. 
In the end, secret deals undermine negotiated settlements, especially when 
each party's constituencies are fearful that their interests may be bargained 
away. 
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A secret deal on a particular issue, once it is "sprung" on an unsuspecting 
public which may be accommodating itself to the new set of negotiated realities 
immediately raises questions across all· divides regarding what other secret 
deals have been cut and still remain unknown to them. There are immediate 
outcries of concern. Whatever fears on all sides the settlement seemed to 
have mollified begin to resurface, but with even greater intensity, and the 
whole settlement begins to unravel. 
In Northern Ireland, British Prime Minister Tony Blair skirted with the difference 
in the small hours of the morning of Good Friday 1998, when in response to 
being informed by David Trimble and other senior members of the UUP that 
they could not sell the Agreement to their colleagues because of the 
Agreement's language on decommissioning, reached for his pen and gave the 
Unionists what they wanted-- a reassurance that decommissioning would 
have to begin before the Executive was formed. If the price for an agreement 
was a letter of reassurance on decommissioning -- not made available to the 
other parties at this critical negotiating point -- Blair was prepared to pay the 
price, convinced that in the end he could square the circle. In his letter of 
"reassurance" to Trimble, Blair said: "In our view the effect of the 
decommissioning section of the agreement, with decommissioning schemes 
coming into effect in June[1998], is that the process of decommissioning 
should begin straight away. 1116 
That letter allowed Trimble to sell the GFA agreement to a majority in his party, 
but did not engender unanimity of support. It insured his leadership of the 
UUP, but not his command of it. 
• A related requirement: There must be no "fudge" factors. Fudge factors don't 
paper differences; they dry in cement. One can tear up paper; cement you 
must bore through. When the cement has never hardened, it becomes 
impossible to bore. The language on decommissioning in the GFA is an 
indescribable mish-mash of ambiguity, defensible multi-interpretations; 
classical avoidance that led to its own ineluctable consequences - the 
impasse that resulted was entirely predictable. Like most complex issues 
written in fudge, the fudge turned to mush. When Sinn Fein insisted that the 
agreement does not call for decommissioning on the part of the IRA as the 
price for its "admission" to the Executive, it is perfectly correct since its frame 
of reference is the agreement itself. And when the UUP insists that the 
agreement calls for prior, or at the very least parallel decommissioning on the 
part of the IRA, it, too, is perfectly correct since its frame of reference was the 
agreement plus the side letter of reassurance from Blair. 
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The South African Constitution that emerged out of the Multi-party Negotiating 
Process (MPNP) and the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly is a model 
of a document whose every "i" had been dotted and every "t" had been 
crossed. 
• Confidential talks/agreements are necessary because in a transparent 
environment, the Heisenburg principle - the principle that the nature of an 
event being observed changes by virtue of the observation itself- becomes an 
integral part of the process itself. Thus, all transparent negotiations become 
hostage to the manner in which they are reported in the media, and thus to a 
propensity to negotiate sensitive issues through the media. Each party tries to 
put its own particular "spin" on matters, issues are reported in isolation from 
one another and without context. Agreement on a particular issue may be 
reported, which might make it appear that one party was making a major 
concession without any reciprocal concession on the part of the other, 
inevitably the context that the agreement is contingent on another set of 
arrangements in different strands of the negotiations. If particulars of a 
settlement are examined in isolation from one another, they will look very 
different and convey entirely different sets of implications than when they are 
examined as their all being part of the one package where the whole is greater 
than the sum of the particulars. 
• Progress comes only when negotiating parties team to start trusting each 
other. Trust is a learned behavior. When one party addresses another, 
especially in a bilateral, it must do so with particular sensitivity to the other 
party's politics and the difficulties it may be having with its own community- or 
even within the party's own ranks. 
• Parties must put themselves in the shoes of their protagonists. They must 
help their protagonists to bring their communities with them. In the end, 
successful negotiations are not so much about bringing your community along 
with you, as helping your protagonists bring their communities along with them. 
Respect for the others' positions is germane to the whole process. The ANC 
and the South African Government (SAG) thought they learned this at a 
relatively early stage in the process. They hadn't. Mistaken preconceptions on 
the part of both, only "corrected" after the protracted "back channel" 
negotiations that led to the Record of Understanding. The ANC had to learn 
that while it was going to become the party of government, the manner in 
which it went about achieving this was more important than the fact that it 
would. The SAG had to learn the subtle fault-lines between the junior partner 
in a power sharing government and the surrender of power. In Northern 
Ireland, it took the parties that really had to learn to do so- the UUP and Sinn 
Fein- a lot longer to get to that point of understanding. Indeed, they both had 
put their signatures to the GFA before they had done so, and it took them the 
better part of 18 months to reach that pivotal fulcrum of reluctant trust that 
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made the formation of the power-sharing government the agreement called for 
possible. But at that point, reluctant trust was not sufficient, and the collapse 
of the arrangements agreed was for all intents and purposes a foregone 
inevitability. 
• The level of trust that develops among negotiators is a function of their ability 
to communicate outside of the formal settings of negotiating structures at 
crucial points. This facilitates the alchemy of interpersonal relations, creates 
empathy with the situations counterparts face -- not as negotiators but as 
human beings with families and community who are trying their best to grapple 
with problems not dissimilar from your own, and coming up against the same 
kind of naysayers, you are among those on whose behalf you are negotiating. 
The discovery of common interests- music, books, sports, similar hobbies, 
childr~n and the problems you have with them, the worries they unwittingly 
give you, the difficulties they have J:o deal with and the fact that their futures 
rest in the decisions you mutually take humanize the negotiating process and 
create bonds that go beyond the bonds that protracted negotiations 
themselves create. 
• If political consensus is to emerge, then mutual trust and respect, tolerance of 
others, and a willingness to compromise must exist at all levels. In this regard, 
where there is a transparent absence of trust on each side of the divide, due in 
part to ingrained cultural differences with regard to language and process-
some of which have their origins in competing claims to legitimacy that 
developed over the centuries - a negotiating process that facilitates 
confidence building actions is more likely to succeed than one that sets up a 
situation more like a poker table than a negotiating table. 
• Party leaders should not act as their party's chief negotiator. Their function is 
to appoint negotiators who act on their behalf. Negotiators are given a 
mandate by their parties. It is the function of negotiators to negotiate away 
their mandates in their quest for compromise and accommodation. It is the 
function of party leaders to "sell" their negotiators' compromises to their parties 
and constituents. It is also the function of the party leader to replace 
negotiators who fail to present the party's mandate in the most propitious light. 
If party leaders act as their own chief negotiators, this may prove to be an 
exceedingly difficult chore. 
• At every level, negotiations should involve the inherent risk of compromise; 
indeed, compromise is the essential ingredient of negotiations, without which 
there can be no negotiations. Each compromise is a building block. As parties 
grow to trust each other and move from one compromise to the next, with 
concessions, though difficult, being made on all sides, every party becomes 
invested in the process, each develops a stake in seeing the other succeed, a 
sum of mutual investments develops, which provides the cushion when it 
comes to the crunch issues. 
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• The concept of "sufficient consensus" rather than being defined in an 
arithmetical way should be defined more flexibly as that level of consensus that 
allows the process to move on to the next stage and does not result in the 
process breaking down. In South Africa this meant that without the agreement 
of both the ANC and the SAG on a particular issue, the issue remained 
unresolved, irrespective of where other parties stood. While their agreement 
would be "courted" it was no longer necessary for the process to move ahead. 
In Northern Ireland, what began as a two-some between the UUP and the 
SDLP, became a three-some once Sinn Fein joined the process, especially 
since the SDLP would not side with the UUP against Sinn Fein. This 
"triangulation" of what constituted "sufficient consensus" complicated the 
process, allowing Sinn Fein to exercise a degree of influence out of proportion 
to its numbers, an influence that was directly attributable to its "influence with" 
the IRA, which, to complicate matters further, was not a party to the 
negotiations, but rather the ghost of things to come should matters come to a 
grinding halt. This reality made the Irish peace process less symmetrical than 
the South African process. Hence, the asymmetrical problems that have arisen 
out of both. 
• Time tables are important, but they should not be overriding. They 
concentrate minds and force participants to meet deadlines encouraging 
compromise, especially when progress has been made on a number of fronts, 
or risking the loss of progress made up to that point. However, compromises 
"forced" on parties in order to meet arbitrarily set deadlines can create 
resentments that will find ways of expressing themselves that will be disruptive 
at some later stage. Coerced compromises are not real compromises. In the 
end they create the kind of backlash they were intended to avoid. 
• All parties must feel an equal ownership in the process. They must regard 
the process as being theirs, the result of their deliberations and agreements, 
that governments are parties to the process, not the owners of it. Negotiations 
in South Africa took place in the turmoil of escalating violence. The Technical 
Executive Committee (TEC) established by the November 1993 settlement 
leveled the playing field; its inclusiveness did not obfuscate the obvious: the 
tacit acknowledgment on the part of all that without the ANC and the NP 
government being "on side" sufficient consensus on the way forward simply 
didn't exist. 
In Northern Ireland, violence, but more especially the threat of an escalation in 
the scale and frequency of sectarian violence provided the concentration of 
political will in London to put Northern Ireland on the political front-burner 
rather than leave it on the back-burner where it had languished in political 
isolation, except for the few occasions when events, usually some particularly 
atrocious action by the IRA, it be moved up a burner or two. 
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Their initiatives, however, were always seriously hampered in one regard. 
Invariably they were government-driven. As a result the Northern Ireland 
parties did not invest themselves fully in the process and were more intent on 
proving that they were not the ones who were to blame when things fell apart, 
as they always did, rather than on seeing themselves as the prime-movers in 
the process and investing themselves in it with the unqualified understanding 
that compromise was the indispensable ingredient of negotiation, and that 
without a willingness to compromise there could be no negotiations. 
• Negotiations break down. Indeed, breakdowns are an integral part of the 
process. To forestall the unforeseen consequences of such breakdowns, 
parties should establish back-channels to each other, one or more members of 
their parties who iron out differences with their designated counterparts. I have 
already referred to the back channel the ANC and the SAG established after 
the breakdown in negotiations in June 1992. 
• Technical Committees are probably the most underestimated but 
indispensable tool of the peace process. Technical committees are made up 
of experts on the issues that divide parties to the conflict. They are 
professional: academics, lawyers, economists, political scientists, and legal 
draftsmen. When a negotiating team which has responsibility for a specific or 
cluster of issues reach broad agreement on the outlines of a compromise on 
an issue, it refers the matter to the technical committee that has been 
assembled to assist the negotiating team to find the language that will resolve 
their outstanding differences, close the loopholes, add caveats, insert the 
necessary amendments, etc. 
They take the draft agreement back to the negotiating team who study it to 
determine whether it meets its specifications; if not, the team refers the matter 
back to the technical committee again with its suggestions and reservations, 
and this process of going back and forth, negotiating team to technical 
committee and technical committee to negotiating team continues until the 
negotiating team is satisfied that all its respective interests and ancillary 
concerns are sufficiently addressed. The technical committee searches for the 
precise language and takes measure of its nuances to ensure that its 
principals' misgivings in the issue under discussion are met. 
In a sense the "dispassionate" technical teams are the real negotiators 
debating and refining the precise definitions of processes, procedures, and 
institutional/ constitutional arrangements that will form the substance of a 
settlement. 
• Negotiators must recognize that it may not be possible to reach compromise 
on some positions. Thus, they agree that when these occasions arise, they will 
employ agreed upon deadlock-breaking mechanisms to resolve the issue. This 
may require using parties/people/organizations/individuals/governments who 
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are not party to the conflict, but whose neutrality and integrity is acknowledged 
by all parties to the conflict. 
• Only win-win settlements work. If one party feels that it has been 
outmaneuvered in some particular respect or coerced into making concessions 
it otherwise would not have made, the resulting resentment as being perceived 
to be the "loser'' will find ways of expressing itself to the detriment of the 
settlement. 
• Process is everything. Get the process right and the substance will follow. 
Process takes preeminence over substance because without process there will 
be no substance. Without a context that provides the fragmentation and 
reintegration of the questions that form the core of the substance in a new 
way, the substance merely fragments. 
• When one party knows that an issue is "non-negotiable" as far as the other is 
concerned, never tum your knowledge of that into a demand that you know the 
other cannot meet. Never "force" the other's hand. Besides the resentment it 
creates - the fact that one party uses knowledge the other has made it privy to 
in the course of confidential exchanges for purposes that would suggest a breach 
of confidence smacks of high-risk gamesmanship that undermines the 
fundamentals of the process itself. 
• Know thy enemy. Ironically, precisely who "the enemy" was proved difficult for 
the South Africans to articulate, but more difficult still for the Northern Irish to 
accept - cultural and historical difference and congruencies working at cross-
purposes. 
· The ANC had always identified the white apartheid regime and the homeland 
states - the puppet black states created by the SAG as the foundation blocks 
of grand apartheid as the enemy that stood in the way of black liberation. One 
of the preconditions it had set before it would negotiate with the government 
would have required that all the homelands and the "independent states" be 
dismantled and that the "heads" of these states would have no place at the 
negotiating table, at least not as the representatives of legal entities. Once 
unbanned, the ANC abandoned this demand and began an elaborate process 
to "cultivate" the very people it had condemned as "enemies" of the people, 
"collaborators" with apartheid. It identified a simple enemy- the white 
government that dominated every aspect of South African life. All blacks, 
irrespective of whom they have made common cause with prior to the ANC's 
unbanning became potential allies, their "sins" forgiven in newly-formed 
alliances. 
In Northern Ireland, the enemy, especially for republicans, was the British 
government and its continued "occupation" of Northern Ireland. There could 
only be a "lasting" settlement when Britain recognized the "folly" of its ways or 
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were brought to see the folly of them and withdrew. There was a bland 
dismissiveness of Protestants and unionism. Protestants were simply seen as 
"Brits" with a false sense of national consciousness who would roll over and 
passively submit to becoming part of an All-Ireland state, once British 
withdrawal made it inevitable. 
Only when a series of treaties and agreements between the British and Irish 
governments finally convinced the republican movement that the only obstacle 
to Irish unity was Protestant opposition to it and that republicans would have to 
convince the Protestant community through negotiations that a united Ireland 
was in all their interests were republicans finally convinced that "the enemy" 
J_hey would have to negotiate the future of Ireland with was not the British 
- government and its forces of "occupation," but the Protestant community was 
progress possible. Even at this point, it is not absolutely clear that hard-line 
republicans accept this reality. 17 Which is why decommissioning will continue 
to be a problem. 
• Know thy enemy -literally. In South Africa, the parties sorted this question 
out after an initial bout of jousting. When the posturing and put-ons were 
discarded, the enemy on either side knew precisely whom they were dealing 
with. A question that appears to pose simple questions often raises more 
complex ones, once examined in a different context. Who makes the decisions 
that count? Who has capacity to deliver? Who has control over the 
constituency it purportedly represents? You had the IFP, PAC, DP, and god-
knows how many homeland and independent state parties. And then you had 
the NP government and the ANC. Once the latter two stopped trying to "woo" 
Jhe IFP, real negotiations were able to start. In order to shake out the real 
sources of authority, you have to begin by being inclusive in every phase of the 
process; that having being done you can afford the wheedling that identifies 
the principals to be carried along in the flood of events, not the riders of the 
flood. 
On the Northern Ireland front, such subtle distinctions were never made. 
Getting Sinn Fein into the process became the overriding political 
consideration. For obvious reasons: without Sinn Fein within the process, there 
would be no peace. The mistaken logic was that with Sinn Fein in the process 
there would be peace. 
When Sinn Fein announced that it did not speak for the IRA, and could not 
convince it to decommission, the ingrained genes of Unionist fears began to 
reassert themselves. Adding to their apprehensions was the confusion of 
tongues over the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein. British Prime 
Minister Blair said the two are "inextricably linked" and that Sinn Fein is the 
mouthpiece of the IRA. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern agrees that the two 
are inextricably linked, but won't go so far as to say that Sinn Fein actually 
speaks for the IRA. Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams says a pox on both your 
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houses, that Sinn Fein and the IRA are two separate organizations and that 
Sinn Fein can make no commitments on behalf of the IRA. The IRA says 
nothing, except for the occasional Olympian utterance- that all of this is of no 
concern to them. 18 One reason they are not a party to the GFA. 
For example, Sinn Fein commits itself in the GFA to the principal of consent? 
Have we heard from the IRA on whether it accepts this principle? Sinn Fein 
accepts that all arms must be decommissioned? Have we ever heard from the 
IRA on this question, other than its ingenuous statements that the British 
government begin to disarm itself? Whose judgments do we breathlessly 
await? Who are they? To whom are they accountable? And, most importantly, 
on whose behalf do they speak? And if we do not know on whose behalf they 
speak, the how can we reasonably say on whose behalf do they negotiate? 
The process of negotiation, the South African parties told the Northern Ireland 
parties, is itself captive to the random nature of events outside the control of 
the parties involved but which may, nevertheless, impinge on negotiations and 
cause parties to switch gears in order to secure their positions with their own 
membership. In short, the key to a negotiation's resulting in a settlement 
acceptable to all parties involved in the conflict is creating trust - far easier to 
objectify than to achieve, especially since the parties which must establish trust 
among themselves must first tear down the barriers of distrust that have 
separated them in the past and fueled their conflict. Dismantling barriers of 
distrust creates a vacuum; how that vacuum is filled is germane to whether a 
propitious climate conducive to negotiations that lead to engagement can 
emerge. Negotiation is a necessary condition for engagement, but not a 
sufficient one. 
• Trust should not be confused with friendship or with the kind of trust that 
builds friendships. "You negotiate with your enemies, not with your friends," 
Mandela said at Arniston. The trust Mandela was speaking about is the 
product of shared understandings, belief in the integrity of the other, 
acknowledgment that they too are trying to the best of their abilities to come 
forward with ways to overcome obstacles and have an equal appreciation of 
the futility of a return to violence. 
In South Africa, the fact that this trust was established is the real miracle, 
especially when one considers the fact that between 1990 and 1994, the 
period covering the release of Mandela after 27 years of imprisonment and 
the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) until the country's first 
nonracial, one person one vote elections, over 4,000 people were the victims 
of political violence resulting from the activities, often clandestine, of the 
state's security forces, and supporters of both the lnkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) and the ANC. 19 
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In the end, the question of having to contemplate the alternatives to a 
negotiated settlement is what brought the South Africans and the Northern 
Irish together. In the end, it is what the two conflicts had in common: situations 
in which neither side could prevail; in which neither side could lose. In 
Northern Ireland this point is understood, but not sufficiently understood. 
At Arniston, the South African participants were adamant on one thing: Even 
when there is an acknowledgment by all parties to a conflict that a negotiated 
settlement is the only alternative to continuing internecine violence which will not 
secure "victory" for one side or the other, the path to negotiations is an obstacle 
course that cannot be traversed in quick and easy steps, but rather one that 
throws up unexpected hurdles, one where good intentions often result in 
unforeseen consequences, a process that will stall and perhaps fail on occasion, 
if the role players fail to establish the necessary trust in each other's legitimate 
bone fides, genuine intentions and commitment to a negotiated settlement even 
in the face of misgivings and opposition among many in their own constituencies. 
In South Africa, the protagonists had to learn this through trial and error, and the 
lessons of failure often were bought at a high price. They learned that 
expressions of belligerence were often covers for expressions of uncommitted 
willingness to talk about talks; that commitments to agreed upon settlements, no 
matter how well-intentioned, are often mere gestures of aspirations; that 
aspirations cannot be transformed into realities unless the foundations are laid to 
build trust among former enemies; that trust is the sine qua non, the one 
indispensable ingredient for successful negotiations; that building trust is a long 
and arduous process, the crossing of a landscape strewn with political land 
mines; that negotiations that lead to settlements require compromises on the part 
of all stakeholders and political pain when once-cherished beliefs have to be 
abandoned; that settlements should not be confused with resolution; that 
resolution only emerges when settlements mature. When the accommodations 
that were necessary to achieve a settlement become redundant with the 
passage of time, the entrenchment of trust, commitment to shared values, 
government that is inclusive and processes of governance that are fully 
subscribed to by all former protagonists as being equitable, representative and 
non-discriminatory; where differences are commonplace, unencumbered by the 
threat of potential conflict. 
Paradoxically, the outlines of settlements are usually self-apparent, although 
seemingly unattainable, almost always due to the obduracy of protagonists who 
will not allow themselves to consider options other than outright victory. 
Obsession with embedded questions of identity, righting the perceived wrongs of 
history, the legacies of collective memories, ethnicity and religion, of issues 
involving the ownership of land scoured with the blood of centuries, the 
possession or surrender of which becomes ineluctably intertwined with questions 
of nationalism and sovereignty make the self-apparent self-emasculated.20 
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Unfortunately, in divided societies, compromise and surrender are for all practical 
purposes one and the same thing. The advocacy of meaningful compromise by 
one of the warring parties or parties supporting the same side is a political kiss of 
death. Thus, players in conflict situations are prisoners of the constraints forced 
on them by considerations of domestic politics. And not unusually, the difficulties 
that pose the most serious impediments to negotiations are due more to intra-
group rivalries than to inter-group differences. 
To be seen as the agent of "selling out" the aspirations of one's group- ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, racial or tribal is a more damning fate than to be the 
instrument of a fruitless war where the only sure outcome is that nothing will be 
settled. 
The path from the acknowledgment of the inevitability of negotiations to formal 
agreement on negotiation procedures, defining an agenda, implementation of 
complex protocols and development of complementary institutional frameworks, 
is invariably a long-drawn out process marked by disagreements on joint 
declarations on the way forward, endemic distrust papered over during 
negotiations, political gamesmanship, and pigheaded recalcitrance. 
Trust is a learned behavior. Learning takes time. In South Africa, trust began to 
develop only among the main protagonists -- the ANC and sAG - after 
negotiations between the two parties had broken down following the Boipatong 
massacre in June 1992.21 
Following the breakdown, the SAG and the ANC established a "channel," to 
maintain a line of communication between the two, represented on the 
government side by its chief negotiator, Roelf Meyer, Minister of Constitutional 
Affairs, on the ANC side by its chief negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary 
General of the ANC. The two met on forty-eight occasions between June and 
September 1992, resolving outstanding issues between the parties and 
developing remarkable empathy for each other's party difficulties, fears, 
hesitancies to move forward, and how these issues might be addressed, but 
more important, developing a remarkable personal rapport. The result was the 
signing of a Record of Understanding between the two parties in September 
1992, opening the way for the resumption of talks at the Multi-party Negotiation 
Process (MPNP) in February 1993 and culminating in the adoption of an Interim 
Constitution in November 1993, and the country's first nonracial election in April 
1994. 
In the absence of alternatives and the commitment on the part of both the ANC 
and the SAG to a negotiated settlement, they made the tough and sometimes 
unpalatable compromises that resulted, in their own words, in a "win-win" 
situation. Compromise, they both came to understand, was not only a necessity 
but the one indispensable ingredient of a successful negotiating process. The 
willingness to compromise, they also came to understand, could reveal itself only 
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when the parties to the compromise trusted and respected each other. It is a 
lesson the Northern Irish understand but have yet to fully absorb. 
In the end, Ramaphosa and Meyer were able to imbue their parties, once the 
most bitter and implacable of enemies, with the trust they had carefully, if warily, 
nurtured. The rest, as they say is history, but not history without pain, detours, 
setbacks, and rivers of blood in which the hopes and dreams of many would 
drown. But they pushed on because they had to; there was no going back to the 
"old" ways. For both blacks and whites the waiting was over. 
In the aftermath of the signing of the Record of Understanding, key members of 
the SAG and the ANC cemented their relationship at two bosberaad meetings in 
December 1992 and January 1993. For four days they lived together, ate and 
drank and talked together, and came to a better understanding of one another in 
the most casual and unceremonious of circumstances. In four days, they 
stepped gingerly, and not without apprehension, across the bridges of three 
centuries; the informal ambiance broke down formal barriers; old animosities 
were seen in new and less hostile lights; the rigid stereotyping that both sides 
had engaged in began to abate and were slowly replaced by a new and 
respectful awareness of one another as individuals, which, even if not fully 
defined or clearly understood, offered room for rapprochement if not actual 
friendship. 
In Northern Ireland, the absence of that trust is only now being addressed. 
Indeed, the fact that it took the provisional establishment of the power sharing 
government by the GFA twenty months to come into being after the parties had 
committed themselves to the agreement can be attributed directly to the endemic 
distrust Unionists have of Sinn Fein and the IRA. 
Even when the UUP agreed to Sinn Fein's taking their seats in the assembly in 
September 1997, it would not talk to Sinn Fein directly; hence there were no 
head-to-head bilaterals between the two parties that held the future of Northern 
Ireland in their hands. They would communicate with Sinn Fein only through 
George Mitchell. Indeed, the party leaders, Gerry Adams and David Trimble, did 
not shake hands with each other until the GFA was signed. Even then, the 
handshake was perfunctory, more for the cameras than for any expression of 
mutual goodwill and intent to work together assiduously to steer the agreement 
through to harmonious implementation. 22 
The failure of the two parties to resolve the impasse over decommissioning and 
establishing the Executive, forced the two parties into head-to-head discussions 
with each other during Senator George Mitchell's eleven-week review of the 
agreement. 
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One benefit of the prolonged impasse over decommissioning that cannot be 
overestimated is that it finally compelled the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein to 
face each other across a negotiating table in bilateral talks. 
During the long and intense review process, they had to look each other in the 
eye. Had to jawbone. Had to develop skeletal relationships. Had to come to a 
better understanding of each other's predicaments. Had to develop human 
images of the "other." 
After Mitchell made the findings of the review public, Sir Reg Empey, the chief 
unionist negotiator, told the media that unionists "recognized the challenges and 
difficulties faced by the leadership of Sinn Fein/IRA" -a statement that 
heretofore would have been an anathema, heresy that could be exorcised only 
with excommunication from the party. 
Others were also noting the change in the relations between the two parties. 
Indeed, in the week& leading up to the conclusion of the Mitchell Review, the 
panaceas heaped on the two parties for their developing understanding of each 
other's problems teetered on the obsequious.23 
Mitchell himself commented on the "reluctant camaraderie" that developed, the 
ineluctable result of Sinn Fein and the UUP having to work long, intensive days 
under sustained pressure and no time-outs. 
In the statement accompanying his review of the agreement, Mitchell said: 
Not long ago, the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein did not speak [to each other) directly. 
In the early weeks of the review, their exchanges were harsh and filled with recrimination. 
But gradually, as one of them put it, 'trust crept in' ... and the discussions became serious 
and meaningful.24 
Later he went a step further: 
The talks had been very tough until the venue moved to the US ambassador's residence 
in London. We sat in the ambassador's living room. We shared meals together. I insisted 
that there not be any discussion of issues at meals, that we just talk about other things so 
that they could come to view each other not as adversaries but as human beings and as 
people living in the same place and the same society and wanting the same thing.25 
The bosberaad had come to the Court of St. James'. But whether it has done 
any good, other than to make strangers less strange to each other rather than to 
foster a camaraderie that remains little more than reluctant, is problematical. But 
even that, in the circumstances of the fierce antagonism that exists between 
Sinn Fein and the unionists, this was an achievement of considerable import. 
In the end, the Mitchell Review did not produce a compromise, merely the 
promise of one. 
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The mistake worked to the advantage of both the government and the ANC. It 
provided De Klerk and his negotiators with more room for maneuver and allowed 
them to use the threat of a right-wing backlash to wring concessions from the 
ANC, concessions it otherwise would not have been amenable to. It spared the 
ANC of having to put every issue to the test of "sufficient consensus," and the 
guerrilla "word-fare" the CP would have undoubtedly engaged in with relentless 
ferocity to make the process unworkable, the passage of time without anything 
being accomplished always working to its advantage. 28 
In Northern Ireland, the right wing (DUP) learned assiduously from the mistakes 
of the South African right wing. Although it walked out of the assembly when 
Sinn Fein was admitted, it never left the process. It learned that once 
abandoning a process, your power of control over its direction becomes 
nonexistent unless you have a paramilitary capacity to support your withdrawal. 
(Sinn Fein always had the support of the IRA; the OUP never had the support of 
any Protestant paramilitary organization.) 
Once you throw in your hand, you deal yourself out of the game, become a 
spectator and watch the remaining players split the residual spoils. 
The OUP, despite its commitment to "destroy" the GFA, never did so at the price 
of sacrificing the two ministerial positions its numbers entitled it to. Hence, its 
participation in the power-sharing Executive- with Sinn Fein- despite its 
disavowals that it would never do so. It always understood the difference 
between "objection" and 11absentionism" --ironically, something it took Sinn 
Fein more than sixty years to learn. 29 
In Northern Ireland, negotiations are more complicated than in South Africa, 
perhaps because the issues are more amorphous and less amenable to precise 
definition. Once Sinn Fein met the conditions for participation in negotiations, the 
axis of power shifted: Sinn Fein and the UUP became the key players, if only 
because anything that was acceptable to Sinn Fein had to be acceptable to the 
SDLP, while the opposite did not hold true. A necessary condition for a peaceful 
settlement was Sinn Fein acquiescence to the outcome, even though it 
represented a minority of the minority community. But that in itself would have 
been insufficient without the UUP's concomitant support. 
POST- ARNISTON 
Was it a worthwhile endeavor? Did it have an impact on the negotiating process 
in Northern Ireland? 
The following are brief quotes from the observations Northern Ireland 
participants and political commentators imparted to me. 
• "On a distant field of a South Africa game park [David Trimble] began the 
journey in earnest from leader of one tribe to the architect of a new 
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inclusiveness in Ulster. It was after that trip, according to one close friend "that 
he knew common ground could develop between himself and [Seamus] 
Mallon." Michael Grove, The Times, 4 July 1998 
• "I [found that] I could learn to love my enemy. We had people there from the 
NP, the African National Congress, people from the old South African Defence 
Force and many of the other political parties involved in the negotiations. What 
I found really interesting about it was that obviously a number of years 
previously these people were bitter enemies, and here they were sitting 
together. From watching their body language it was clear that many of them 
actually liked each other, even loved each other. The message for me was that 
if they can do that, we can do that also. No party could remain unaffected by 
what they heard and I believe that in the weeks and months ahead we could 
possibly see the results of that trip." 
Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein chief negotiator, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 19 September 1997 
• "For me the real value of the trip was how the key players handled the 
process, how they related to each other, how they overcame difficulties in the 
process as they developed." 
Jeffrey Donaldson, MP,Uister Unionist Party, 7 January 1999 
• "Each group in South Africa, not each participant in South Africa, felt some 
acceptance of their identity in the final outcome. /learnt that the process was 
in the ownership of the participants." 
Gregory Campbell, Democratic Unionist Party, 7 January 1999 
• "Perhaps the most imporlant message was to people who might be tempted 
to jump off [the] negotiating train. That message got through to some vel}' 
important people. If you walk out of any process that's the road to ruin and 
marginalization." 
John, Lord Allardyce, former leader of the Alliance Party, Speaker of the Nl Assembly, 6 
January 1999 
• 'What we all took away were many lessons about how the South Africans 
had handled their process, particularly the confidence-building dimension, 
which we hadn't fully appreciated in terms of the extent to which it could go, 
the significance of it, and the way in which it was subsequently built into our 
negotiating process." 
Sean Farren, Senior Negotiator, SDLP, 9 January 1999 
• "It was probably a critical turning point in our negotiations and it happened at 
the right time which was gratuitous inasmuch as it couldn't have been planned 
to have happened at the critical turning point." 
Monica McWilliams, Women's Coalition, 7 January 1999 
• "Listening to the South African negotiators - the generals and the politicians 
-was vitally important to us. You had, for example, Mac Maharaj [a senior 
ANC operative and key negotiator]. He had the authority to reinvigorate the MK 
war. But he was redeployed to defend the peace process. That is very similar 
to what happened to the UVF. The UVF had a kitchen cabinet whose job it was 
to escalate the war to end the war. But out of their deliberations and their 
analysis came an appreciation about things that were going on among 
Republicans and they decided it was better to have a look at these things 
rather than escalate the war. So there were things that had resonance. The 
importance of increased communication between politician and paramilitaries 
was something vefY evident when we learned how people like Matthews 
Phosa [another key ANC negotiator] were used to ensure that the 
communication levels were increased between the militarist and the politician. 
All had resonance for us. I think the constitutional Unionist politicians were very 
affected by South Africa. Trimble and Robinson were. Robinson's own 
admission to me on the way back in the airport at Johannesburg made it very 
clear that he found it a very significant journey and a vefY significant 
experience. We may not have seen that played out fully in all of his politics but 
the level of understanding in the period of transition was vitally important for 
people who knew what they would have to do but hadn't got the balls to do it. 
Perhaps for them to recognize that you're not alone in this world and that 
others have gone through it before you with m·ore stark division and brutality 
and pain than we has had an impact." 
David Ervine, Progressive Unionist Party, 9 January 1999 
• 'We came, we saw, we listened, we learned- and we applied " 
Gary McMichael, Ulster Democratic Party, 9 January 1999 
• 'The round table seminar in South Africa, away from the media spotlight, 
which was attended by representatives of all the parties involved in the 
negotiations in Northern Ireland, provided an invaluable forum for face-to-face 
discussion between parties and people who found it extremely difficult to meet 
on their home ground in Northern Ireland. In facilitating that process of human 
interaction, the South African retreat could be described as a precursor to the 
type of atmosphere which helped us achieve the breakthrough in the review 
carried out under the chairmanship of George Mitchell." 
Bertie Ahern, T.D., Irish Prime Minister, South African Institute for International Affairs, 
University of the Witwaterstrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 12 January 2000 
• 'TAhern] highlighted the round-table discussions between key Irish players, 
held in South Africa in 1997, as having heralded a breakthrough. "It was highly 
complex, and South Africa went to a lot of expense to assist and show people 
what could be achieved, and I know that all politicians without exception who 
played a part in that discussion came home believing that this problem [the 
Northern Ireland problem] could be cracked in some way. This was no more 
than two years before they made the enormous moves that they had not dared 
to dream about for the previous sixty to seventy years." 
Michael Morris, interview with Bertie Ahern, The Sunday Independent [South Africa], 
16 January 2000 
SOME POST- ARNISTON OBSERVATIONS 
Eleven problems threaten to "throttle" the Northern Ireland peace process with 
what are formidable but not insurmountable obstacles: each stands in striking 
contrast to the manner in which events unfolded in South Africa. 
First, the absence of continuing meaningful contact between the UUP and Sinn 
Fein at the highest levels. Without establishing key back channels, without 
helping each othe_r to bring their respective recalcitrant communities into line, the 
prima facie preconditions for a durable self-sustaining accommodation will 
continue to be elusive. The trust that is the sine qua non for such an 
accommodation does not exist. Establishing it is a matter of immediate urgency. 
Second, the absence of contact between the IRA and party, other than Sinn 
Fein, making it impossible to distinguish between Sinn Fein as player and Sinn 
Fein as surrogate. 
Third, the absence of any strong belief in Northern Ireland that the suspension 
of the peace process will eventually result in the collapse of the process, the 
belief that somehow the process has become self-sustaining. 
Fourth, the absence of a belief that failure will result in some cataclysmic 
upheaval, i.e. a blood bath of unfathomable proportions. 
Fifth, a propensity to believe that cease-fires that have held for four years will 
not become casualties of prolonged stalemates; that there is no going back to 
"the bad old days." 
Sixth, the sense of false security that repeated last minute "rescue" turnarounds 
has induced has engendered a political ennui where people believe that the 
protagonists have lost the will to "restart" the conflict. 
Seventh, the amorphous yields of the peace "dividend" have dulled memories of 
the 30 years of violence, creating a vacuum of will. 
Eighth, an unstated but very firmly rooted belief that the process has become 
irreversible in the sense that the costs of going backwards are far greater than 
the imperceptible gains of going forward. 
Ninth, the "millennium" factor- that the last ten years of slaughter in the former 
Yugoslavia makes the conflict in Northern Ireland look rather amateurish. As 
wars go, Northern Ireland is a Third Division affair, not the stuff of the "big" 
leagues. That in the 2000s, it's more about nonsense than about beliefs. 
Tenth, national identities are no longer threatened or embraced in the way in 
which they were 30 years ago. The parades will go on and we will quarrel 
forever. Drumcree is war by other means. 
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Eleventh, Decommissioning. In South Africa, the matter was never satisfactorily 
dealt with, but in a sense it didn't make any difference. In the final analysis it 
would have involved the ANC as liberation movement having to hand over guns 
to the ANC as government. In Northern Ireland the question is both qualitatively 
and quantitatively different. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There are none. The failure to resolve the matter of decommissioning resulted in 
the institutions of the GFA being suspended on 11 February 2000- in 
retrospect an unsurprising outcome, given the way in which the matter was 
handled throughout the process.30 
But it was an unfortunate one in the sense that in using legislative means to do 
so, the British government "took" ownership of the process away from the parties 
in Northern Ireland, thus undermining their need to understand that in the final 
analysis it is up to them to negotiate their differences, that only when they 
acknowledge this fundamental principle which underpins all successful peace 
processes will they empower themselves to reach the necessary but unpalatable 
accommodations that will secure the peace. 
Enforced coalitions rarely work, and never under circumstances where the 
"partners" to power sharing have mutually opposing aspirations - antithetical to 
each other in the perpetuation of "us" and "them." South Africa remains an 
experiment, Northern Ireland a laboratory test. 
We can share our experiences with one another but we cannot replicate them. 
Learning from others is no substitute for learning from ourselves. Voices heard 
are not voices listened to. In this respect, the Northern Irish have a distance to 
travel before they can transmogrify putative trust into purposive risk-taking. 
Decommissioning is, as Senator Mitchell insightfully pointed out, symptomatic of 
a larger problem: the absence of trust. 
And therein, the worm at the core. The worm, however, has many ways of 
wriggling. 
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Either in government or outside it- pursuing the argument on decommissioning - it will be 
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30. Almost 20 months after the GFA was ratified, the power-sharing Executive and other 
institutions, the agreement called for finally came into being but with the clear understanding on the 
UUP side that it would withdraw from government if the IRA had not begun to decommission its 
weapons by 12 February 2000. To buttress his position with the Ulster Unionist Council, the 
governing body of the UUP, Trimble provided it with a predated letter of resignation as First 
Minister. As part of the "interim" arrangement, the IRA agreed to appoint a representative to the 
International Body on Decommissioning, under the chairmanship of General John De Chastelain, in 
order to facilitate this process. On 5 February 2000, the IRA issued a terse statement that "we 
have never entered into any agreement or undertaking or understanding at any time whatsoever on 
any aspect of decommissioning." Which is true -it was not a party to the GFA. 
On 11 February, De Chastelain issued a second report in which he said that "we find particularly 
significant and view as valuable progress the assertion made to us by the IRA representative that 
the IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use, in the context of the full 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, and in the context of the removal of the causes 
of conflict (my boldface). Which begs the obvious question: Whose causes are we talking about? 
On 15 February, in response to the suspension of the GFA institutions, the IRA withdrew its 
representative from the De Chastelain Commission. In its statement, the IRA said, "Those who 
have made the political process conditional on the decommissioning or silenced IRA guns are 
responsible for the current crisis in the peace process." 
On 20 February, Peter Mandelson, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced that the 
British government may release a timetable for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern 
Ireland. He said the British government wanted to normalise security in the North but added that 
any changes must be "in the context of the threat (of violence) going away and politics working." 
He told The Observer newspaper: "The idea that the British government want the military to hang 
in there and talk tough, irrespective of the political process, is nonsense. We want to normalise 
security. There is no pressure to keep more battalions permanently based in Northern Ireland than 
are strictly needed for low-key patrolling purposes." 
"Withdrawal of British troops" - music to the ears of the IRA. It's what it has been after all along. 
See Opsahl Report on Northern Ireland. 
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